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The analysis of a (geo)political failure

The "Grand Chess Table" and the security of Nato's southern flank

Last year, the American National Intelligence Council published a world’s evolution prognosis, outlining its future until 2020. The stake of US supremacy pervaded the projection of the American agency concluding that, by 2020, the world would not undergo radical changes, while American hegemony, though threatened, would uphold.

Before analyzing global changes, Romanians are interested in the challenges of ordering Romania’s neighboring environs, as well as in giving an appropriate projection to the major regional security topics relevant for the area,.
Romania has been finding itself at the center of several geopolitical global projects, thus entailing an urgent establishment of a viable connection between the decision-making entities responsible with the implementation of these projects. The “security” feature is essential to these projects as our analysis starts from pinpointing Romania’s security risks by comparing them to the evolutions of its Eastern neighbors comprising powerful energies and tensions.
Regional democratic processes are affected at such a large a scale that they raise questions and arouse anxieties worldwide. “The Russian democratic endeavor has been backsliding”, stated Vice Admiral Michael McConnell when summoned in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for a hearing concerning present and future threats to the US’s national security. Starting from this assertion, the present study aims at briefly outlining features relevant for Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, as well as at evoking the interaction of those “Eastern processes” concerning Romania’s national security.

Last year, Vice Admiral Michael McConnell replaced John Negroponte at coordinating America’s 16 intelligence agencies, as the latter joined Condoleezza Rice at the State Department as her deputy. Mike McConnell, the current chief of the American espionage, turned heads worldwide by daringly stating, while delivering his official reports in Congress, that “Russia is one of the main threats to the US’s national security”.
The US has identified a threat in the fact that Russia, China and the OPEC countries may use their market access as a financial means to politically influence, said Mike McConnell also noting that, “by consolidating its position due to oil revenues, Russia tends to take over energy resources and transport infrastructures in Europe and Eastern Asia. At the same time, Russian military forces have started to overcome a long state of deterioration, while Russia and China have long been preparing to hack American computer networks to collect secret information”. The American intelligence has also been warning about the peril of the deterioration or collapse of the information infrastructure, a goal that may lead to an alliance between Russian and Chinese endeavors.
The head of the American espionage referred to “the Russian peril” on a number of other occasions as well. Thus, in September 2007, he warned of an increasing activity of the Russian and Chinese intelligence on US soil, rising to the Cold War level.
John Negroponte’s successor also cautioned the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Kremlin’s tendency to adopt a harsher position would unavoidably lead to an increasing enmity between Russia and the US. “A flourishing economy and some internal and external policies perceived as successful, contributed to consolidating Russia’s confidence, allowing increased expenses for defense matters, as well as encouraging Kremlin to pursue foreign affairs goals that do not always converge with the ones pursued by Western institutions“, said McConnell. In his opinion, this tendency will become more obvious, and after the 2008 presidential elections in Russia, the autocratic trend will become even more powerful for the internal affairs run by Kremlin.
Thus, McConnell concluded that “Russian perseverance will continue to inject elements of rivalry and antagonism in the relation between Washington and Moscow - especially when it comes to our involvement in the ex-Soviet region – and will destroy the possibility to cooperate with Russia in matters such as non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism or energy and promoting democracy in the Middle East”. Moreover, “as already proven by the assassination of Aleksandr Litvinenko, the continuous piling-up of problems and irritating factors is threatening to increasingly affect Russia's relations with the West”, emphasized McConnell.
Vice-Admiral McConnell's criticism towards Kremlin’s policies was followed by several similar remarks on Russia made by politicians and high-ranking military officials. In front of that very same senatorial Committee, lieutenant-general Michael Maples, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that Russia, as well as China, would continue to enhance their military space capacities. Maples showed as well that, as far as the collecting of information was concerned, Russia had “the most highly developed potential when compared to the prospective foreign adversaries of the US”.
Robert Gates, the American Secretary of Defense, also made some comments regarding Russia and China's military aspirations, by stating that the upgrade of their armies represented one of the reasons for which the US must continue keeping up the modernization of its own military. Gates emphasized that these circumstances, coupled with the terrorist threat and the Iranian and North-Korean menace, forced the US to use its defense resources so as to “manage these challenges in an adequate fashion”. By mentioning Russia together with countries such as Iran or North Korea, Gates placed Moscow in the ranks of the regimes considered as a threat to the national security of the US.
The American warnings were emphasized by Great Britain, where the chief of MI5, Jonathan Evans, stated, in his first speech after taking over the institution, that “Since the end of the Cold War, there has not been noticed a drop in the number of the Russian agents sent to Great Britain to the Russian embassy and the organizations that work undercover in this country”. “Despite the end of the Cold War two decades ago, the service still directs funds towards protecting Great Britain against the espionage activities conducted by Russia, China and other countries”.
While dwelling on the American and British statements, the Russian media noticed that, for the first time since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Russia had ended up on US' black list. “This time, the Americans were frightened not by the Russian missiles, but by the economic, financial and scientific potential of Russia and China, potential which, in Michael McConnell's opinion, may be used for increasing the global influence of these states”, stated the Moscow-based newspaper Izvestya. However, all this had a bright side to it, asserted the above-mentioned daily. “If the Americans came to be afraid of Russia, this means that they have started to respect us as well. The conclusions of the American intelligence agencies may be seen as an acknowledgment of Russia's consolidating its place in the world, as well as a recognition of the fact that the global system, with the US as world master, is about to disappear”, further noted Izvestya. “The fear of Russia, seen as a potential military threat towards the US and its European allies, that has been lurking ever since the dismantling of the USS.R. is becoming increasingly tormenting for the American General Army Staff”, added Kommersant as well.
American hegemony is more and more exposed to security threats, while the obsession for security and the siege mentality, characteristic to the “garrison-state”, stand as the price that the Americans have to pay for the status they have arrived at.
Today, the anti-American hostility – once sponsored and heavily directed by Moscow's agents – has new vectors, while being practically self-fueled. The technological advance and the development of global communication systems allow a more rapid information (and inflammation) of the masses. In effect, the images of the Abu Ghraib tortures have almost immediately flooded the world, touching hearts and souls everywhere without requiring a long and costly press campaign, according to the former standards of psy-ops. Perceiving the US as “enemy no. 1” at an increasingly larger scale may become a real problem also for the microscopic level of Romania. The rhetoric of the current Kremlin Administration is following the footsteps of this discourse tackling the “danger” of US’s influence at Russia’s frontiers, while the state of mind at the national level obviously inclines towards revenge. The resurrection of the national ego is immense. Russia demands to be avenged in front of the West, especially in front of the US. Still, Russia alone can no longer be an important global player – this is to be seen even in the policy of its partnerships with China, India, etc. In its imperial state, Russia did not need to be “partner” with anyone. At best, Russia would dwell on patronages, not partnerships.
On Washington’s account, “enhancing global security is a component essential to national security”, while the critics at the peak of the American defense system are warning that “the present security strategy is obsolete in the context of the global exposure that we are facing nowadays”. For Romania, referring to Europe as a security warrant is an illusion. “Europe”, “the EU”, the so-called nowadays West is an entity that still lacks identity, vision and mission. The “European dream” of the “European man” aims at obtaining private comfort first of all, unlike Zinoviev’s Homo Sovieticus still residing in Russia and not only, who dreams of retribution.
As far as Romania is concerned, some serious anxieties result from the Black Sea endeavor and US isolation from the EU that tends to aggravate in the subsequent period. Washington is, thus, the only player left having offensive stakes on the geopolitical realm in which Romania may be found, though a player troubled as well by internal or external problems stifling its momentum. Unfortunately, Ukraine remains one of the strategic stakes essential to NATO or the EU. Romania (and Moldova) remains on the back burner. A serious “flaw” of Romania’s national security strategy is the absence of a well-defined national identity program. For this reason, our peers outside Romania’s borders are ignored and practically eliminated from the political agenda, as well as from the institutional design endeavors. An important human resource is thus wasted, while the long-term implications may be serious if we take a closer look to the “corrosion” level of the Romanian communities in the areas subjected to some desegregation and “crumbling” processes. One can feel the need for an initiative to make up the national security agenda, starting from the identity issue and admitting that we are facing a crisis that requires a rapid remedy. For the Romanians, being interested in the strategic cohesion on national interest is a major topic, as our political performance is suffering and will continue to suffer from lack of an internal cohesion. It is obvious that the security agenda must be adjusted and that Romania must refer to the new security imperatives determined by globalization and especially the American force factor.
The top team in Washington is currently preparing for change, while our Romanian initiatives – “The Black Sea”, Moldova etc. – are stalling. As of 2009, we’ll have new leaders in Washington and Moscow as well. This year’s elections, both in Russia and the US, are seen as decisive for revamping the future regional configuration. One will see if the US fit the pattern of discontinuity characteristic to the Republican-Democrat alternation at the White House.
As far as Russia is concerned, what we can do, however, is pretty much foresee that the future Czar will continue the “Putin doctrine” – a political line very different from the “Sinatra doctrine” that followed the “Brezhnev doctrine”. Russia’s former “political” stand of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of its satellite states of the Warsaw bloc is a history long gone. Russia is nowadays all around. From Venezuela to the Arctic Circle, Russia is aiming to counter-balance the US, NATO, its latest creation being the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – an intergovernmental structure with an Asian dominant that brings together Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

We are witnessing an ongoing large-scale social, political, cultural identity-prone phenomenon: Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration in the context of Russia’s reemergence as an important player in the Pontus-Baltic area, soon after two other major developments of the post-communist era – the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic influence (the US and NATO) and European integration (the EU).
As frontier country of both NATO and the EU on the Southern flank of the Pontus-Baltic area, Romania is expected to answer in an adequate and qualified manner to the new problems of the East. The Romanian regional interest comprises tensions and force vectors of far greater strategic stakes. The whole area of the “new Europe” has come about to a rather powerful resurrection due to the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic border at the outskirts of the so-called global system.
Years ago, after Georgia and Ukraine’s “defection”, Russia found itself forced to drastically restrict its area of influence. Russia’s seeming “confinement” had come in the form of new boundaries around Russia across the Caucasus, on one hand, as well as on the Baltic line. Besides, once Ukraine had succeeded to break from Moscow’s influence, there seemed to have taken place a narrowing of the control exerted over the Black Sea and the Pontus-Baltic area, as well a cession of a significant part of Russia’s influence towards the West and the South.
Harta Marea Neagra“Nowadays, Moldova, despite its smallness and incumbent capabilities, has become a key player for Russia in the CIS”, wrote Nezavisimaia Gazeta in August 2000. Starting from this, in 2000, an IntelMedia feature published under the “Basarabia at a crossroads” title offered the Romanian public opinion, political factors and mass-media a documentary analysis on Moldova, “the key player of CIS”.
A number of data regarding the evolution of the political and economic situation of the important – according to the Russian point of view – Romanian territory, were gathered while singling out the “(unfortunate, yet more acute than ever) radical return of Chisinau to RSS Moldova”. The study in question noted that “communism had donned an ethnic coat and, though shrewd maneuvers or rough force, accordingly, was preparing for an inconspicuous comeback in the tiny Romanian country”. This menacing perspective was confirmed by the electoral slogan of one of the communist groups: "S Rossiei na veciniie vremena!" (Forever with Russia!).
Referring to this study represents a guideline since most of the (geo)political projections comprised by the material have come true in the past eight years. The authors stated that “the general elections held in spring of 2001 had represented the most important event of the past decade of existence for the 'independent state of the Republic of Moldova'”. For the Romanians on either side of the Prut river, the results of these elections, in which for the first time the winners had taken it all with just one move - Parliament, Presidency and Government as well –, would become more important than they had first met the eye. The whole configuration of the area would be reshaped according to the vote's results. It was hard to believe that Romania would not be affected. However, the mass-media, the public opinion and the Romanian political class are still not showing any sign that they understand that the Russian border wave promoted by Voronin’s communists and Moscow’s pawns at the top of the political hierarchy in Chisinau will soon bring the cold in the houses of the Romanians in Romania as well”. The study ended with a review of “Russia’s offensive” under the new imperial seal of “the Putin doctrine”.
If one takes a look at the current situation, one can see that the above stated prerequisites was confirmed. Moldova has become Russia’s last card, finding itself in front of a serious geopolitical dilemma. As soon as Ukraine is out of Russia’s hands, the military outpost in Transdniestr won’t be able to hold on any longer, given that it is practically 1.000 kilometers away from Russia. Moscow will either succeed in projecting its force at a rather considerable distance, while continuing to exert its military, political and economic control at the Black Sea, or it will fail, loosing a final stronghold, as well as wasting away important logistic means.
The 2007 local elections in Moldova and the terrible loss of percents suffered by the communists marks the beginning of the drift for the present governance. Year 2009 is supposed to mean a massive drop for the Communist Party. The electoral campaign project of PCM for 2009 is extremely easy to anticipate, by this meaning that it will be identical with that of 2001, summed up by the "S Rossiei na veciniie vremena!" (Forever with Russia!) slogan. Of course, Romania will be the favorite subject of the communist propaganda. A Romanian nation still held captive by forces controlled by Russia is offered the chance of a new dynamics, while the drive of the movement could bring Moldova a little bit closer to Europe. As for the extent to which Romania is prepared to take over or sustain this dynamics, this is a question that has not received an answer yet.

The present context is determined by the collision of some geopolitical force lines that were designed and drawn in 1999, with NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia. The US unilaterally imposed its will then and now, while in Kosovo’s case history will repeat itself. However, nowadays’ Russia and its capacity of response are a whole different story. One can easily foresee that the spark of Kosovo’s independence will rekindle conflicts. The “Kosovo matter” entails the future status of Transdniestr as well, among other hotbeds of so-called “frozen conflicts” that Russia can melt at anytime.
“Romania will take advantage of the Kosovo precedent and ‘will slowly swallow’ the Republic of Moldova, with Transdniestr as well”, speculated the Russian daily Pravda last month, while concocting a fictitious story. Even if the possibility of recognizing Transdniestr is not ruled out altogether, “today, Moldova stresses upon another problem: not admitting former Bessarabia be annexed to Romania”, continued Pravda.
Moldova is the first victim of the new Cold War declared by Russia to the European civilization. The combat area of the new Cold War encompasses practically all the states that were mutilated almost a century ago by the Hitler-Stalin agreement, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
Although Russia formally lost these states, it has not given up trying to gather them once again under its influence, despite their resistance or accepting Russia’s guidance, as in Moldova’s case. The Russian-speaking communists in Chisinau provided Kremlin with the occasion of regaining some important positions, fact which will affect other states as well. Estonia, Georgia and Moldova represent a symbolic alignment of the confrontation between the West and Russia.
Estonia is powerful not only as far as its local elites are concerned, but also due to its having joined the EU, while in Georgia Western influence is still powerful. Moldova, however, has already been lost by the West, according to the foreign analysts. For the Russians, Moldova represents a primary target, as it concentrates important logistical and informational resources that can sustain a genuine image war to portrait Romania as the main enemy of Moldova. At the Russia-EU Summit in Lisbon, President Putin threatened Romania openly by referring to the potential effects of Kosovo’s independence on regions such as Dobrogea and Transylvania.
Moldovanism is created by Russia on purpose so as to induce an identity crisis, but also to create a pseudo-nation – the Moldovan one. The “Moldova national” was necessary to justify the territorial rapt made by Stalin and Hitler. Moldovanism is just a symptom of an illness. The disease is an old one – Stalinism – and cannot be eradicated as long as the nowadays Russian youth still consider Stalin as an emblematic figure for the Russians.
Moldovanism is promoted with great efforts sustained by Washington and Brussels as well, not to mention other European institutions so as to sustain a point of view very dear to the communists in Chisiniau, according to which Bucharest has nothing to do with the European integration of Moldova.
For Chisinau, Hungary is the main partner of the Republic of Moldova on its European way. Moscow is not at all a stranger when it comes to introducing this perspective to all levels. The concord between Budapest and Chisinau is reversely illustrated by a long series of “discords” between Chisinau and Bucharest. By eliminating the Romanian National Television (TVR 1) from Moldova, the row of the three episcopacies, the scandal regarding the Basic Partnership Treaty between Moldova and Romania, with the special pointing out of the linguistic difference between the two, as well as of the border between the USSR and Romania settled in Paris in 1947.
At Chisinau, the public confrontation has as a primary target the identity matter. The top members of the political power in Chisianu are oriented and trained in then Bolshevik rhetoric on Romania, all of them blindly reproducing the Leninist and Stalinist propaganda of internationals.
The politruks at Chisinau are attached to Moldova only because they hate Romania, since they are, after all, Soviet; unfortunately for them, the Soviet Union is long gone. They have not forgotten, however, Moscow’s address and always seek guidance there, looking at the red star on top of Kremlin.
The official ideology of Chisinau – Moldovanism – is a paradoxical matter altogether, being the main support of Tiraspol as, according to the principle of synchrony, if Moldovanism is good enough for Chisinau, why wouldn’t it be Transdniestrism good enough for Tiraspol?
President Vladimir Voronin’s speech actually legitimates the secessionist and separatist ideology of Tiraspol. The invention of the Moldovan nation and its language helps Tiraspol to define itself in the same parameters. As a matter of fact, Tiraspol proclaimed its independence a year earlier than Moldova. Now, after the unilateral and illegal proclamation of Kosovo’s independence, it will not take more than a light push for the domino effect to start.

Moldova, formerly known as RSSM, represented the South-West flank of USSR’s offensive-defensive plans. All problems and claims of the Russian state were to be found here: the Danube waterway matter and that of dominating the river, which represented a way of influencing the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, the access to the Black Sea, the matter of the straits, as well as dominating this sea till the Atlantic, and the adjacent territories.
Moldova hosted a powerful strategic military base that wasn’t, however, a defensive one, but an offensive one, aiming at the South-West and South directions. Even from the early ‘80’s, the RSSM command center had been oriented towards the main enemy of the USSR – the NATO countries. The main enemy category included the US, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as all the countries that had joined NATO, thus the USSR, through its General Army Staff, elaborated a new strategy. Its attention was primarily directed towards the South-West, especially after NATO had started to increase its forces in the South flank in the early ‘80’s.
At the command of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chisinau hosted a complex of the Russian General Army Staff for the South-West direction. Kiev or Odessa, that had access to the Black Sea, as well as to the Black Sea ports, was by-passed in favor of Chisinau due to the enhanced possibility of carrying out radio-electronic espionage. From Moldova one could “listen to” most of Europe.
The XIVth Army present nowadays in Transdnistr had been dislocated all over RSSM and represented only the tip of the iceberg hidden to the rest of the world in this area.
The reorganization made by the General Army Staff of the USSR came with the merging of the Military Circle of Kiev, which comprised the Transcarpathian region as well, the Military Circle of Odessa, with the main forces at the Black Sea, the missile and air forces. Drawing a line, these forces amounted to 37 divisions, more than 2.000 aircrafts, 800 helicopters, an antiaircraft unit and other military technique, which meant that an offensive could have been initiated on three fronts: North, West and South. The Transcarpathian military district represents a sort of training area that aimed at concentrating the command of the troops while at war. Here there have taken place several military maneuvers from regiment level ones to strategic and allied-forces ones.
In the early ‘80’s, some time before the official reshuffle or even in its early stage, the Soviet started to withdraw their troops over the strategic line of the Dniestr, that is in Transdniestr, thus transforming it into a strategic military base for both the Soviet empire that had begun to crumble, as well as for its successor, the Russian Federation.
As the troops had started to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, the strategic role of the South-West group began to increase. To the already existing logistics various other units, military equipment and technique, as well as ammunition, were added, all these coming to amount to the combat means necessary for two armies in the early ‘90’s.
The nowadays capacity of the military forces in Transdniestr is identical with the one of 1992, suffering changes only regarding its denominations, as well as transfers of Russian troops and equipment to the military units in Transdniestr.
All these represent Russia’s bridgehead towards the Balkans, while Russia is the least interested in changing its presence in the region in such a short while. In order to seem that it does not intend to withdraw its forces and equipment in the due time agreed in Istanbul, Russia will be counting on the communist leaders in Chisinau.
The Russian Federation needed – and created – in Moldova a political leadership able to ensure an untroubled military presence in the area. Voronin’s vocal attacks on Romania and the freezing of the Chisinau-Bucharest relations represent a symptom of Moscow’s “repositioning” at the “Euro-Atlantic border” in the context of an increased European and American interest for the Black Sea region.

The Black Sea represents a key-feature for Europe’s security, while the attention that the Black Sea is currently enjoying is linked to the desire of extending the European stability area – from Romania and Bulgaria towards East, in the Caucasus –, as well as from the Middle East and the major project yet to be fulfilled: Turkey’s integration, followed by that of the Caucasus, which would represent a third wave of Euro-Atlantic integration comprising Ukraine and Georgia as well.
Only a decade ago, Romania found itself at the outskirts of a stable and democratic Europe. Now, it is close to the center of this map, if we bear in mind the third wave of Euro-Atlantic integration. The same as Poland played a leading part in defining the policies of EU and NATO regarding Ukraine, Romania is expected to play a similar role in developing a strategy regarding the Black Sea.
Romania was explicitly asked to participate to the effort of understanding the conflict in Transdniestr so as to help the US in building a local strategy for the Black Sea that would bring together the great European power. The American attitude points out a particular interest in the area, confirmed by NATO’s change of tactics, as well as by the new direction taken by America’s geostrategic interest in the ex-Soviet region.
Securing energy routes leading to the Caucasus through the Black Sea area is essential for both the EU and the US.
The American State Department counted on Romania as its main partner in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and there existed an ascending tendency important for the Washington-Bucharest relationship. The leader of the American Administration, President George W. Bush, repeatedly stressed upon the fact that the US and Romania would take part together in the developing democracy in Moldova.
Romania’s involvement in solving the Transdniestria problem is possible through the EU as well, giving the fact that the European community is interested in solving a conflict that risks to directly affect its security, as well as that of the future extended Europe. The EU, however, has limited weight in Moldova and still does not have a clear strategy as far as solving the conflict in Transdniestria is concerned. Unfortunately, neither does Romania, which is expected so much of, little less a strategy regarding the resolution of the “frozen conflict” in Transdniestria. Russia often invoked a comparison between Transdniestria, South Ossetia or Abhazia with Kosovo or the Basque Country. On September 17th, 2006, over 90% of Transdniestria’s inhabitants voted in favor of independence and of subsequently joining Russia.
Recognizing Kosovo’s independence provides Russia with virtually unlimited possibilities to blackmail the US and the EU with applying similar measures to acknowledging the unrecognized areas in the ex-Soviet region. Russia far more values the possibility of infinitely using this argument than recognizing Abhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, while counting on using this trump in the geopolitical game with the West.
Thus, one may recall the comment made by Russian analyst Vitali Tretiakov even before the recognition of Kosovo’s independence: “no matter the course undertaken by the situation, Russia wins. Kosovo will declare its independence the West will recognize it and Moscow’s hands will be untied. Should the West change its mind (although not likely), Moscow will assert its influence… Thus separatist maneuvers become boundless.”

In March 2005, OSCE invited Romania for the first time to join the EU and the US in the negotiations meant to bring the conflict in Transdniestr to an end. Although Moscow and the separatists in Tiraspol opposed this, the invitation of the OSCE chief confirmed the opportunity offered to Romania to join the process of solving the Transndniestr conflict with the purpose of securing the Black Sea area. Subsequently, Romania proved to be unwelcome in this project, mainly because of Ukraine’s opposition.
Moldova is playing the card of securing the continental geopolitical border. Russia is using military levers – in Transdniestr, as well as ethno-political instruments as far as the identity matter in Moldova is concerned, such as imposing Russian and Moldovan references only when it comes to state ideology. Romania has the implicit obligation to rapidly devise a strategy for the relationship with the Republic of Moldova, as well as for resolution of the Transdniestr “frozen conflict”.
Until now, there haven’t been any signs of such a program, although the stake is a very serious one, while the geopolitical decryption, the analysis and understanding of the regional vectors prove to have several shortcomings, which makes state institutions seem confused and having no clue regarding the problematic and dynamics of the area.
The Republic of Moldova has, at least declaratively, a major interest: that of Romania’s becoming associated not only symbolically to any form of guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Moldova. At the same time, the communist regime in Moldova displays open hostility towards Romania and the Romanians, while engaging in several initiatives of turning the population into a Moldovan one by using Stalinist guidelines. Most gestures of the political power in Chisinau are coordinated so as to aim- directly or indirectly – the very ethnic identity of the inhabitants across the Prut river.
The theses of the National Politics Concept of the Republic of Moldova are not new, but to be found in the style of the Soviet ideologists and event in the Stalinist politics of nationalities. Moldovanism is in effect a geostrategic factor that was employed for the first time in 1924, when RSSM was formed. Moldovanism is nowadays used by the Moldovan politicians as an internal weapon used to the same extent by the Ukrainians and the Russians anxious about the boost of the “Romanian factor” after Romania’s joining the EU. Moldova’s attitude affects Romania’s chances of getting involved in solving the Transdniestr conflict in partnership with Moldova.
The Republic of Moldova is a member of NATO’s Peace Partnership, sent troops to Irak, but is also militarily engaged with Russia while having signed a number of agreements of cooperation with the intelligence of its Eastern neighbor, as well as with the Interior Ministry and border patrols of not only Russia, but also of the CIS states. The provisions of these agreements are incompatible. One may say that the Republic of Moldova is under Russia’s guidance de facto, while Moscow is using energy and economic blackmail, as well as Transdniestr as a political “anchor” for the whole area.
After Ukraine’s separation, the loss of Odessa and of the important military ports at the Black Sea, Azerbaijan’s entry under the influence of Turkey, a great NATO power, Georgia’s getting ready to host some American bases on its soil, now, more than ever, Russia sees the keeping of Tiraspol as bearing an overwhelming strategic means, while remaining the only bridgehead towards South-Eastern Europe. Legalizing Russian control in Transdniestr means lowering the Russian strategic frontier towards NATO’s Southern flank and behind Ukraine.
The Transdniestr stake is the key of a viable strategy for the Black Sea. A wrong EU strategy regarding the Black Sea would be a serious instability factor at EU’s border, threatening the conception of a Euro-Atlantic geopolitics for the Black Sea on long term. For the US it is obvious that the most important stake of them all is securing the Southern flank of the Pontus-Baltic isthmus by isolating Transdniestr, settling the “frozen conflict” once and for all, diminishing the Russian military presence in the area and neutralizing its strategic capacity.
At a geopolitical level, Romania and the Republic of Moldova are placed in what classic geopolitics calls “the Pontus-Baltic Isthmus”, as Simion Mehedinti put it, a theory revisited today by Russian geopolitics through A. Dughin. On another hand, we are facing an identity resurgence, at times obviously instrumented by the political and economic elites of the former USSR, sometimes authentic, while having, in both cases, extremely important cultural, social and economic effects.
One of the central factors of the geopolitical state of the Pontus-Baltic Isthmus is the reinventing of Russia as a regional and global power (Z. Brzezinski), based especially on an aggressive energy policy and a refined manipulation of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts within the former empire.
EU and NATO integration sparks a reordering of the regional problems, as well as a re imaging of those in global idioms. These idioms acquire an important significance at any attempt of decrypting the sociological, anthropological and geopolitical situation.
Romania finds itself in an area of borders, as well as in a region that comprises powerful geopolitical tensions. Romania’s importance as a regional actor increases with its integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. For the states at the outskirts of the EU, Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, that are to be found on the line of the Pontus-Baltic isthmus and in the Black Sea region, the geopolitical context still remains unclear. The stakes are high and insufficiently analyzed. Russia still plays a leading role in the Pontus-Baltic isthmus, but the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea are areas of silent confrontation, in which frozen conflicts are maintained through the Russian military outposts in Moldova (Transdniestr), Georgia (South Osetia and Abkhazia) and Azerbaijan.
Transdniestr is still considered to be the most serious problem-area on Europe’s map. Romania can act through EU’s POV in support of the Western security vectors so as to help provide a resolution to the Transdniestr problem.
Moldova pretends to be interested in following a European direction, but the way to the EU won’t be walked with Transdniestr as it is. Understanding events in Romania’s proximity and most of all the situation across the Dniestr river is important since we have a “geopolitical knot” in the area, which cannot be untied by the West, nor severed by the US. The threat is direct and aimed at Romania on one hand, as well as at the European security design on the other, and can even counterbalance the continental geopolitical equilibrium.
Romania’s role as “a bridge” towards Europe is very important in the context of European integration, while the Bessarabia-Transdniestr region holds the key part of the vault to this construction on its Eurasian limit as it entails the control of Eastern Europe. According to one of the main laws of geopolitics as enunciated by Halford Mackinder, “who controls Eastern Europe rules the Heartland (the region between the Ural and Pamir, Volga and Iantzi), who controls the Heartland rules the World Island (Eurasia) and who controls the World Island rules the World”.
One may conclude that, economically and politically speaking, the Moldovan region has the characteristics of all other regions that make up that continuum that the experts in geopolitics refer to as the Pontus-Baltic isthmus, a “buffer-zone” for Russia’s attempts to expand on mainland and those to assert a new integrated European area.
It is obvious that the West is trying a more serious anchoring of Moldova on the agenda of the international financial institutions, while counterbalancing the direction in which things are heading in this small area of the Pontus-Baltic isthmus that is Moldova. The two trends initiated by this propagation of capitals in the Republic of Moldova provide for all the tensions to be found in this tiny region where Europe meets Russia.

In Ukraine’s `case, our diplomacy displays the same complexes that it shows when it comes to Russia. The bilateral treaty signed by the Romanian and Ukrainian parties before the 1997 Summit in Madrid met one of the conditions for Romania’s joining NATO or at least this is what the Constantinescu Administration had announced at the moment.
The treaty was signed, the differences remained. The concessions made by Romania as far as Ukraine was concerned were significant, even if one considered the fact that the Romanian state practically did not give up Snakes’ Island in Ukraine’s favor but in 1997. Dividing the continental shelf of the Black Sea still has not received a settlement, nor has the Romanian party regained its investments in the Ukrainian industry. The permanent concessions and helplessness are symptomatic and characteristic to the relationship between Bucharest and Kiev, respectively Moscow.
The hypothetic democratization of Ukraine and its potential joining NATO or the EU will not solve the bilateral difference, just as the Cyprus dispute between the Greeks and the Turks was not solved, although both countries are NATO members.
In Kiev, even before Romania joined the EU, the former prime-vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Cealii, had stated that “the Romanian fact” would have represented a real peril to Moldova’s dismantling if it had joined the EU and a significant number of Moldovan citizens had gained double citizenship – Moldovan and Romanian as well.
As most Moldovan citizens can apply for Romanian citizenship at any time, according to the Romanian Constitution, the Russians and the Ukrainians feared that the Moldovans might slip through their fingers. Declaring a significant number of Moldovan citizens as Romanians will blow up the Stalinist concept of “the Moldovan distinctive nation”. The ideological support of Moldova would collapse. Other hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian “Moldovans”, in the former Bucovina, may apply for citizenship or the right to be considered Romanians, which would also imply the right to a political representation in Parliament. Ukraine’s political equation may be seriously shaken, which shows that Romania has what it takes to worry Stalin and Ribbentrop’s inheritants.
The “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea region are determined by the Russian military presence and cannot be solved unless resorting to global strategies promoted by the local states with international support. The essential problem is who’s in control. . Legalizing Russian control in Transdniestr means lowering the Russian strategic frontier towards NATO’s Southern flank and behind Ukraine. The Black Sea represents a key-feature for Europe’s security, while the attention that the Black Sea is currently enjoying is linked to the desire of extending the European stability area – from Romania and Bulgaria towards East, in the Caucasus –, as well as from the Middle East and the major project yet to be fulfilled: Turkey’s integration, followed by that of the Caucasus, which would represent a third wave of Euro-Atlantic integration comprising Ukraine and Georgia as well.
The Transdniestr stake also alludes to the future of the Republic of Moldova, also involving the Russian Army and Moscow’s interests in the Southern flank of NATO. For the Republic of Moldova, the officials across the Dniestr rive represent the main threat to its existence as a state. The separatists in Transdniestr, Abkhazia and South Osetia, the Crimean problem (with the matter of Black Sea fleet) and the latest separatist “movements” in the East of Ukraine, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabkh are all Moscow’s instruments to maintain its control in area of a strategic importance to the Russian Federation.
Given the social and political instability, the economies of the CIS countries are going through a structural crisis artificially fueled by the conflict areas stirred by Russia. Armenia’s industry is entirely dependent on energy imports from Russia and threatened by the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan. The economical cooperation between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is undermined by the lurking conflict in the Fergana Valley area.
Romania’s role as “a bridge” towards Europe is very important in the context of European integration not only for the Bessarabia-Transdniestr region, but also for Ukraine. Romania’s interest in Ukraine and Ukraine’s interest in Romania have always been determined to a great extent by their strategic-military position. The Bessarabia-Transdniestr region has always played a key feature in this relationship.
The main axis of the European security system, which will eventually extend over Ukraine and the Bessarabia-Transdniestr region, is the cooperation between France, Germany and Poland with the EU and NATO, due to subsequently expand as far as defense in concerned. According to Z. Brzezinski, given the geopolitical interest of Germany and Poland in Ukraine’s independence it seems likely that Ukraine may be gradually drawn in the relationship system between France, Germany and Poland. In 2010, this quadruple cooperation comprising 230 million people may transform into a geostrategic partnership of utmost importance for Europe.
“Following Ukraine’s separation, Russia lost its supremacy in the Black Sea, where Odessa was a port crucial for commerce with the countries in the region, as well as with the rest of the world. Russia’s loss of supremacy in the Baltic Sea had repeated in the Black Sea as well, not only due to Ukraine’s independence, but also to the emergence in the Caucasus are of the new sovereign states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, facotr which facilitated the re-establishment of Turkey’s former influence in the area. Until 1991, the Black Sea was used by Russia as a gate of access and control for the Mediterranean Sea. However, by mid ‘90’s, it retained only a coastal strip at the Black Sea, while having developed a row with Ukraine over the right to place in Crimea the remainders of the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea, thus irritably following the joint naval maneuvers of Ukraine and NATO and the assertion of Turkey’s influence in the area.” (Z. Brzezinski)
Turkey, which hosts in Izmir the HQ of the South-East NATO troops, has become an extremely important pivot for securing the area. The Black Sea and the Azov Sea are o be found in NATO’s area of direct responsibility, fact which imposed the necessity of creating around the Black Sea a stability area. There is a project of creating a durable alliance between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, which could eventually be joined by the Republic of Moldova as well. Georgia and Azerbaijan’s presence in the alliance would facilitate the implementation of energy projects, while Turkey would exert the task of a liaison to this structure. In a way, this alliance would be similar to that between France, Germany, Poland and Ukraine that is meant to become the central part of the European security design.
If these vital programs would come true, Ukraine could become a geopolitical centre gathering the main axes of Euro-Atlantic security, while the Bessarabia-Transdniestria region could come to undertake a key-role as vault to this construction. In the absence of control over this crucial segment that is the Bessarabia-Transdniestria region, Eastern Europe cannot be controlled.
Engaged in the Euro-Atlantic design, Ukraine and Romania are in the proximity of the area and have all the interest to take part to intensifying the inter-dependence in the “frozen conflict” perimeter that is Transdniestria. Kiev’s good faith will be tested through its collaboration with Bucharest on the Transdniestria matter.

According to the “Putin doctrine”, Moscow reserves the right to intervene militarily in solving any conflict in the neighboring countries, as well as the right to maintain under its control the oil pipelines linking Central Asia to the Caucasus and the West, even “those segments of the energy infrastructure outside Russia’s boundaries”. The doctrine provides for the presence ad eternum of Russian troops and military bases in the Republic of Moldova, in the Transdniestr region, despite the decisions made at the OSCE summits in Istanbul and Porto. As far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, Russia has not abided any international decision regarding the withdrawal of its troops and ammunition in Transdniestr; moreover, it launched and is currently carrying out diplomatic endeavors to “legalize” its military presence in Moldova, as well as to continue exerting its regional control by openly supporting Trandsniestr, “the mafia-like enclave upheld by the Russian army”, as Z. Brzezinski plastically put it.
The management of crucial geopolitical regions – such as the Pontus-Baltic isthmus or the Caucasus – is disputed by Russia with noticeable results. In order to maintain its influence over Central Asia, Russia, together with the Central-Asian republici, put into place the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
On the other hand, Russia also drew in China by sharing the control over the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Prior to this, while taking into account the same Eurasian vector, Russia had founded the Euro-Asian Economic Community of CIS and pushed through the signing of the Collective Security Treaty (CSA), thus consolidating the pro-Russian core of CIS.
Russia also created the EvrAzES Customs Union – the Eurasian Economic Community –joined by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Eurasian Customs Union will eliminate restrictions to flow of capital, introduce a single customs tax and a single border outside the Eurasian Economic Community (EvrAzES). It is said that there will be founded a supranational entity to take over a series of prerogatives now managed by the founding countries. Uzbekistan, the GUUAM defector, joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization gathering these countries and Armenia as well. There already have been taken important decisions about creating of a single energy market of EvrAzES and also regarding the settlement of the water and energy problems in Central Asia,
The restoration of CSA after the Warsaw Treaty model, while placing the military forces of the signatory states under a single command, becomes increasingly important (this refers to three regional groups: the Western one – Russia-Belarus, the Caucasian one – Russia-Armenia and the Central-Asian one – Russia-Kazakstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan; their military forces would come under Russian command in case of aggression).
The two cooperation group orbiting Russia would eventually come together with another one – Iran, with its impressive energy resources. The energy block associated with Russia could become one of the largest in the world, as energy tends to become one of the most effective weapons in Russia’s hands.

As main provider of gas for the mainland and one of the largest oil exporting country, Russia’s decision to restrict gas deliveries to Ukraine and, implicitly, to the EU countries in December 2005 subsequently started a series of lively talks about finding an alternative to confer Europe independence from the Russian energy resources.
The projects in this domain have advanced with great difficulty. Currently, there are three great energy projects in which Romania is involved as well: Nabucco, Constanta-Treiste and the underwater cable for the transfer electrical energy between Romania and Turkey. The Nabucco gas pipeline that is promoted by the EU and the US aims at becoming an alternative to the Russian energy infrastructure, as well as at allowing Azerbaijan to deliver gas directly to the European market through Georgia and Turkey.
The Nabucco consortium is made up by (OMV), Hungary (MOL), Romania (Transgaz), Bulgaria (Bulgargaz) and Turcia (Botas), which were joined by the German company RWE (second leader in the German energy sector) as of February 2008, while France’s attempt to become the seventh partner of the project was rejected. Launched in 2002 as a project, the Nabucco pipeline will be 3.300 kilometers long. Its execution was scheduled to start in 2009 and end in 2012, while its costs are estimated to arrive at 4.6 billion Euro.
As a reply to the Nabucco project meant to put an end to European dependency on Russian gas, Gazprom, the energy giant that holds the monopoly of Russian gas, together with the Italian company Eni developed the South Stream gas pipeline in 2007.
South Stream would come to cross the Black Sea, starting from the Russian port of Novorosiisk to the Bulgarian port of Varna, where it would split in two directions: one heading South, to Greece and Italy, while the other heading North, to Serbia. Its costs were estimated at 10 billion Euro, almost three times higher than those for Nabucco, as South Stream would become the longest underwater pipeline, to cross the Black Sea.
South Stream would avoid Romania, as well as Ukraine, one of the hypotheses that go about its alimentation being that of cutting the gas quantities currently exported through the Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The European Commission, as well as two of the companies involved in the Nabucco project do not seem to be worried by South Stream, which was perceived until recently as rival to Nabucco; on the contrary, they consider that Europe needs more energy resources, while stating the Nabucco remains a priority. On February 11th, 2008, the Russian company Gazprom declared that it is ready to take into account the possibility to join the Nabucco project.
The President of the Nabucco consortium, Reinhard Mitschek of the Austrian OMV, seems open, as well, to the prospect of running Russian gas through the pipeline even by resorting to the Blue Stream pipeline linking Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea as well.
OMV, the company controlled by the Austrian government, signed a deal with Gazprom in order to transform the Baumgarten terminal near Vienna, initially designed to be the final stop as well a storage facility of Nabucco, into a company owned at a 50-50% ratio by Gazprom and OMV. The same OMV, as the company leading the Nabucco consortium, is currently arguing for the reservation of half of Nabucco’s capacity for Gazprom’s use.
In Vienna, OMV’s CEO Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer, saluted Gazprom’s arrival to Austria via Hungary through the South Stream pipeline, as well as through the already existing pipeline coming from the East, both heading for the Baumgarten terminal that was supposed to be Nabucco’s final stop.
Gazprom is now gaining ground against Nabucco in Hungary as well. On February 25th, the Socialist PM Ferenc Gyurcsany agreed on the occasion of Medvedev’s visit Budapest to extend South Stream to Hungary as well. The MOL private company was not included in this endeavor. The Hungarian company will create on purpose a state companied, owned 50-50% with Gazprom, to develop and operate the Hungarian segment of South Stream. Thus, the Hungarian socialists are renationalizing a sector of their energy system through a Russian controlled process.
The US, which supports Nabucco as an alternative to Russia, says that Azerbaijan currently has enough gas in the Shah Deniz field to fill the pipeline, thus encouraging its project partners not to let themselves intimidated by Gazprom’s “PR offensive”.
Romania seems to be the only loyal contributor to Nabucco, which is expected to deliver Caspian gas via Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe. The project on top of the EU’s priority agenda, also endorsed by the US, has suffered several abandons. It cannot survive with the current merely encouraging support of Brussels and Washington, in the absence of access to Central Asian and Iranian gas.
“If one looks at it from Moscow’s point of view, the smartest thing that it can do is promote South Stream and, if this fails, join Nabucco. Russia’a biggest hit would be building the South Stream and joining Nabucco as well. The whole justification of the latter is that it offers an alternative route and alternative resources. And, should we have a company under Kremlin’s control as part of this project, we can no longer speak of an alternative route and we might as well give it up”, stated Alexandros Petersen, energy expert of the American Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“If Gazprom joins the Nabucco enterprise, it will be less politically motivated to develop South Stream. After all, Gazprom would reach the same political goal – either by providing gas for Nabucco or by building South Stream that would hinder Nabucco’s development. All these agreements (with Bulgaria, Serbia, Austria and Hungary) are meant to consolidate Gazprom’s role as a political instrument of Kremlin and perhaps to consolidate Medvedev’s position once elected president”, stated Swedish analyst Niklas Nilsson of the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm.
According to a study of the European Commission, the EU’s imported energy percent will increase from approximately 1/2 in 2000 to 2/3 by 2020. The use of gas will gain ground rapidly due to environmental considerations and the disappearance of several nuclear energy sources of the EU.
In the first decade of the 21st century, the deliveries on the Zamal-Europe and the Blue Stream pipelines will help Russia to increase its gas sales to the EU and Turkey, arriving at more than 40% by 2020. As effect, Russia’s quota to European demand will increase from 27% in 2000 to 31% by 2010. Moreover, Russia, as the largest energy provider outside OPEC, will be very well positioned to dispose of its oil and gas reserves to sustain its internal and external policy goals.
Russia has initiated an energy offensive in Europe by “capturing” EU member states interested in “dialogue”. Germany was the first to fall, as one of the largest European energy consumer that signed through Chancellor Gerhard Schroder a deal regarding the development of a gas pipeline (North European Gas Pipeline - NEGP) under the seabed of the Baltic to arrive to the North of the country without crossing the Baltic States and Poland. Germany practically ensured its energy security, in the context in which it gave up freely nuclear energy, while Russia harmoniously coupled to one of the most important EU member states. Once solved the German problem, the phenomenon of taking over Europe would subsequently gain momentum.
In Austria, Gazprom signed a Cooperation Agreement with OMV regarding the mutual development of a commercial hub for gas in Baumgarten. Gazprom holds a 50% share in the Central European Hub for Natural Gas and the two companies will develop projects for gas storage in Austria and the neighboring countries. The targeted goal is its extension and development so as to become the number one transit centre in Europe by creating an international market.
In 2006, Gazprom acquired shares in the Hungarian gas and energy companies in exchange of allowing E.ON to take over the Iujno-Russkoe fields in Serbia. Gazprom and the Hungarian company MOL founded a company to study the potential extension of the Blue Stream pipeline, in use as of November 2005, which delivers Russian gas to the North part of Turkey (the Italian company ENI also joined the project).
In Slovakia, Gazprom owns 49% of the SPP network, together with Ruhrgas and Gas de France, while in Turkey it delivers gas to 2/3 of the country, through the South of Europe and a pipeline in the Black Sea that it operates together with Eni. Gazprom wants to buy the distribution companies in Turkey and also intend to export its gas to Israel.
In the Czech Republic, Gazexport, a division of Gazprom, signed a contract with the local gas provider Vemex in order to deliver gas in the country and, thus, eliminate Czech monopoly.
Gazprom intends to develop a storage facility for gas in the Baltic States, but is also seeking alternative routes for its pipelines so as to avoid transit through these countries that are traditionally hostile to Russia.
In Serbia, Gazprom Neft, the oil division of the Gazprom group, signed a deal regarding the acquisition of 51% of Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS). Although the officials in Belgrade estimated this privatization at 6 billion Euro, the final figure was six times smaller. Serbia thus thanked Russia for its support in the lost battle for Kosovo.
In Bulgaria, Gazrpom now satisfies the oil demand and transits gasoline to Greece and Turkey. Gazprom wants to buy a part of the Bulgarian state company that holds the local monopoly – Bulgargaz, as well as the new nuclear plant at Belene and the heating plant in Sofia. The Atomstroyexport company, which is owned by Gazprom, will build the new power plant al Belene, a project that is worth 4 billion Euro. Through this contract, the Russian concern Atomstroyexport is entering a EU member state. Atomstroyexport was joined by the Areva/Siemens consortium, which wants to provide for the security equipment.
Gazprom signed a deal with Bulgaria as well regarding the participation to South Stream – the development of a gas pipeline linking Russia and Italy through the Black Sea. Bulgaria is utmost important for the Russian project regarding the development of this pipeline designed to deliver gas to Europe as it is meant to host the splitting segment of South Stream so as its South-Western part may arrive to Greece and Italy and its North-Western part to Serbia and Austria. In its turn, Greece has announced that it would double its Russian gas imports after 2016.
Moscow’s strike ruined European hopes to diminish its dependency on Russian oil and gas, while the South Stream project will seriously question the feasibility of EU’s Nabucco enterprise.
Besides all these moves on the “Grand Check table”, in 2006, Russia argued for the development of the international transport corridors by promoting the “East-West” project with an exit to the Trans-Siberian railway in the Far East and even further in Europe. Another project is the “North-South” international transport corridor that is about to double its exchange volume between the European and Asian countries in the following 5-10 years
Opening the “North-South’ corridor – on the following route: the port of Mumbay (India), the Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf and those at the Caspian Sea, the Russia port Olea near Astrakhan and further towards Sankt-Petersburg – will be a convenient Russian alternative to the already existing transport routes for goods, respectively to the traditional maritime way starting in Asia and arriving in Europe through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal taking 35 day.
The move is a grand one since it practically strips the Mediterranean of its strategic position by considerably diminishing its prominent role. Russia does not exert its control nor does it have access to the Mediterranean as it is a sea under the control of the US Army, while the Mediterranean is the geopolitical heart that links Europe to the other continents.
The assault of the Mediterranean, together with intervention in the Atlantic and in the Eurasian and Central-Asian regions are the signs of Russia’s vast global offensive. It’s the resurgence of Kremlin’s strategy that Moscow has been waiting for year, while representing Russia’s reassertion as a great world power. If Vice Admiral Mike McConnell is not wrong, Romania, with its role and Euro-Atlantic boundary, will have to bear a significant part of the tension entailed by the new dynamics of Russian rapacity.

George Roncea

Ultima modificare pe Joi, 12 Iulie 2012 21:40
George Roncea

George Roncea

Email: roncea@yahoo.com



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